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A JIH SPECIAL FORUM ON BREXIT: IMPLICATIONS FOR UK 
AND EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
 
Collected and Edited by Dr. Christopher Moran 
 
On 23 June 2016, in a landmark referendum, Britain voted to the leave the 
European Union (EU). Together with the election of Donald J. Trump as 
the 45th President of the United States later that year, the referendum, 
colloquially known as “Brexit”, marks the biggest shake up of the political 
order since the end of the Cold War. In the same way that 1940 has been 
labelled the ‘fulcrum’ of the twentieth century, with historian David 
Reynolds arguing that the fall of France was instrumental in shaping the 
pattern of international politics for nearly 50 years, so 2016 might well be 
viewed in years to come as the ‘fulcrum’ of the twenty-first, setting in 
motion a sequence of events that define several generations.1  
While it will take years, if not decades, for the political, economic 
and social consequences of Brexit to become fully apparent, the 
implications for security, both in the UK and across Europe, plus the 
impact on intelligence agencies responsible for achieving it, are likely to be 
felt much sooner. Depending on which side of the Brexit fence one sits, 
the picture is either a cause for concern or optimism. Among the most 
interesting and passionate voices in this heated debate have been national 
security practitioners. Indeed, a noticeable feature of Brexit has been the 
willingness of senior intelligence officials to put their head above the 
parapet, eschewing the tradition of neutrality and impartiality in matters of 
policy, to talk about the issue. American spooks have been similarly vocal 
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in contributing to public discussions about President Trump. A sign of the 
times perhaps? 
Before the referendum, among the intelligence officers to make the 
case for Britain remaining in the EU were Sir John Sawers, a retired head 
of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), and Professor Sir David 
Omand, a former Director of Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ). Given the cross-border nature of contemporary terrorist, 
criminal and cyber threats, they argued, Britain needed more, not less, 
security cooperation with Europe. ‘Terror networks operate across 
borders, and so must we if we are to stop them’, Sawers declared. 2 By 
choosing to leave the EU, they claimed, Britain would lose access to 
valuable information-sharing initiatives and databases, including 
involvement with EUROPOL, which boasted Robin Wainwright (a Briton) 
as its Director, and the European Arrest Warrant, which, in allowing for 
the speedy extradition of suspects between EU member states, is generally 
regarded as a vital tool in combatting transnational or cross-jurisdictional 
threats. ‘We are part of an established information sharing network with 
our partners whilst still retaining control of our borders. The best of both 
worlds’, announced Omand, ‘Why jeopardise the flow of information we 
receive’?3 For Sawers, a further concern related to the economic impact of 
Brexit. If, as he and many economists predicted, economic and 
commercial malaise took effect, the corollary of this would be less public 
funds available for essential intelligence work. Moreover, a weak post-
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Brexit economy would be fertile ground for terrorist and criminal activity, 
which thrives on uncertainty and angst.4  
Speaking from the opposite end of the Brexit spectrum, Sir Richard 
Dearlove, another former head of SIS, suggested that leaving the EU 
would have little, if any, impact on Britain’s liaison relationships with 
European intelligence agencies, irrespective of what pundits and politicos 
contend.5 Such relationships, he stressed, existed on a largely bilateral basis 
and did not require EU membership. According to Dearlove, European 
security bodies such EUROPOL or the Club de Berne were fairly 
insignificant actors in the fight against terrorism, whilst the recent Islamic 
State attacks in Paris and Brussels confirmed that intelligence sharing 
between European spy agencies is painfully poor and thus not something 
Britain – Europe’s undoubted intelligence superpower – should be unduly 
worried about losing. Europe, of course, has nothing even remotely 
resembling a common or federal intelligence service, which some scholars 
see as a major structural weakness.6  
A dyed-in-the-wool Atlanticist, Dearlove underlined that Brexit 
presented an opportunity for Britain to strengthen its bilateral intelligence 
sharing arrangements with its NATO allies, including the United States, 
which were far more valuable to UK security than any cooperation within 
the EU. Echoing Dearlove, from across the Atlantic, William Binney, a 
former technical director at the US National Security Agency (NSA), has 
claimed that Brexit would not make ‘one bit of difference’ to Britain’s 
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secret links with European and American partners, whilst also pointing out 
that leaving the EU would give Britain greater flexibility to set national 
policy on surveillance powers and data retention.7 
With Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty having now been invoked, 
triggering the stopwatch on a notional two-year timeframe for Britain’s 
complete withdrawal from the EU, it is an apposite moment to look closely 
at what the future might hold not only for British intelligence and security 
agencies, but also for their counterparts in an increasingly fractured 
Europe. Accordingly, the Journal of Intelligence History has put together 
the following special forum, with short conversational-style contributions 
from a diverse range of experts. A key objective behind the forum was a 
desire to inject some much-needed academic balance and nuance into the 
debate, which thus far has been plagued by accusations of scaremongering 
on both sides and – to use a phrase that has rocketed into the global 
lexicon – “fake news”.  
The journal would like to thank all of the authors for their excellent 
work, timely delivery, and enthusiasm for the task.        
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